Arthur Danto and Warhol's Brillo Box
In 1964, Arthur Danto walked into the Stable Gallery in Manhattan and this singular event seemingly changed an aspect of the face of contemporary aesthetics and the philosophy of art. What had apparently dawned during the 1960s, was a kind of tolerance that allowed for just about any old artefact to have status as an object of art. If enough members of the artworld community - artist, public, curator, critics - could certify its place and importance in the appropriate setting, the thing itself is endowed with artistic power (The institutional theory, George Dickie). What Danto saw for the first time time that day was Warhol's Brillo Box.
Danto questioned how Warhol's Brillo Box could be classed as a work of art, when its counterpart on a supermarket shelf was merely a functinal item for marketing a household product. To explain this phenomenon, Danto came up with his theory of indiscernibility (differences are invisible). This conceptual tool embeds works of art within their historical/cultural context. According to Danto, the theory was timely and unique (avant-garde) because it could not have had explanatory power one moment earlier. If we accept that Brillo Box was the first of its kind, then by reasoning deductively the artistic practice gave rise to the theory. Danto wants to persuade us that his historical theory, consisting of the idea that works classed as art are dependent upon external factors like knowing 'something of the history, and something of the theory that defined the relevant artworld of that moment' (Danto (2002), The Abuse of Beauty, xiii), has the power to provide us with a definition of art. The crux of Danto's theory is that there is nothing in the artefact itself that qualifies it as a work of art. That job is explained through the historical and cultural context of which the piece is a construction.
However, for me, Danto's theory of indiscernibility can be challenged from the viewpoint that Warhol's Brillo Box is obviously distinct from its counterpart. The two items in question fail to be indiscernible. For example, if we consider the material from which each box is constructed, we note that one is distinctly discernible from the other. Warhol's is made from ply and is scaled up. Smaller and made from card, its supermarket cousin is obviously similar, but not indiscernible. The difference is clearly evident. Perhaps eager to develop an insightful principle, Danto has tried to make universal claims ('that what makes an object an artwork is external to it', xvii), but considering the error in the 'indiscernibility' thesis, has instead only given us a dressed-up version of Plato's aesthetic theory of mimesis (imitation). Never mind that a Brillo Box did not exist when Rembrandt painted The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Tulp; on the same account, anatomy lessons were not prevalent during Antiquity, and of the paintings from Antiquity we see no works depicting anatomy lessons (Although Aristotle performed anatomical studies, the Greeks were more interested in the proportions of the human form for artistic representation). To be sure, aesthetic artefacts are constructions of their historical setting. But, whether this insight can carry the weight of providing the necessary and sufficient conditions for a definition of art seems unsubstantiated.
Failing as a representative of 'indiscernibility', Brillo Box is not a unique paradigm case of the Externalist thesis. Warhol's work does not singularly portray the idea of indiscernibility. Nor is it indiscernible from its corresponding twin. The proposition seems to be a false prophet. However, what does exist for all these instances, and is the universality that Danto seeks for his philosophy of art (He says, ' ... one can aim at last at a timeless philosophy of art only at a moment like the present one, which is after all unique in the history of art. Only by paying the closest attention to the art of my historical moment, have I been able to hope for a philosophy of art valid for all historical moments' [Danto (2002), xx].), is the theory of imitation, that which explains that Brillo Box is once removed from its real-life complement and second removed from the great Brillo Box that resides in the realm of Platonic Forms.
Danto questioned how Warhol's Brillo Box could be classed as a work of art, when its counterpart on a supermarket shelf was merely a functinal item for marketing a household product. To explain this phenomenon, Danto came up with his theory of indiscernibility (differences are invisible). This conceptual tool embeds works of art within their historical/cultural context. According to Danto, the theory was timely and unique (avant-garde) because it could not have had explanatory power one moment earlier. If we accept that Brillo Box was the first of its kind, then by reasoning deductively the artistic practice gave rise to the theory. Danto wants to persuade us that his historical theory, consisting of the idea that works classed as art are dependent upon external factors like knowing 'something of the history, and something of the theory that defined the relevant artworld of that moment' (Danto (2002), The Abuse of Beauty, xiii), has the power to provide us with a definition of art. The crux of Danto's theory is that there is nothing in the artefact itself that qualifies it as a work of art. That job is explained through the historical and cultural context of which the piece is a construction.
However, for me, Danto's theory of indiscernibility can be challenged from the viewpoint that Warhol's Brillo Box is obviously distinct from its counterpart. The two items in question fail to be indiscernible. For example, if we consider the material from which each box is constructed, we note that one is distinctly discernible from the other. Warhol's is made from ply and is scaled up. Smaller and made from card, its supermarket cousin is obviously similar, but not indiscernible. The difference is clearly evident. Perhaps eager to develop an insightful principle, Danto has tried to make universal claims ('that what makes an object an artwork is external to it', xvii), but considering the error in the 'indiscernibility' thesis, has instead only given us a dressed-up version of Plato's aesthetic theory of mimesis (imitation). Never mind that a Brillo Box did not exist when Rembrandt painted The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Tulp; on the same account, anatomy lessons were not prevalent during Antiquity, and of the paintings from Antiquity we see no works depicting anatomy lessons (Although Aristotle performed anatomical studies, the Greeks were more interested in the proportions of the human form for artistic representation). To be sure, aesthetic artefacts are constructions of their historical setting. But, whether this insight can carry the weight of providing the necessary and sufficient conditions for a definition of art seems unsubstantiated.
Failing as a representative of 'indiscernibility', Brillo Box is not a unique paradigm case of the Externalist thesis. Warhol's work does not singularly portray the idea of indiscernibility. Nor is it indiscernible from its corresponding twin. The proposition seems to be a false prophet. However, what does exist for all these instances, and is the universality that Danto seeks for his philosophy of art (He says, ' ... one can aim at last at a timeless philosophy of art only at a moment like the present one, which is after all unique in the history of art. Only by paying the closest attention to the art of my historical moment, have I been able to hope for a philosophy of art valid for all historical moments' [Danto (2002), xx].), is the theory of imitation, that which explains that Brillo Box is once removed from its real-life complement and second removed from the great Brillo Box that resides in the realm of Platonic Forms.